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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between grain trade fi nancing and business 
structure in the grain trade of the lower Yangzi region in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries (1870-1936). While the region’s industrialization in the early twentieth 
century was taking place, grain trade also underwent structural changes. In particular, 
the emergence of ‘vertically integrated enterprises’ in the fl our milling industry provided 
an opportunity for the extension and expansion in the networks and scale of the lower 
Yangzi grain trade. However, how did the participants in the rice and fl our markets solve 
the fi nancial problem of business expansion? Did the fi nancial sector in the lower Yangzi 
region play an active role in the development of the grain market? Was there any 
difference between the rice and fl our trade in terms of their respective fi nancial structure? 
If so, why were they different? These questions will be central to our investigation.
Keywords
business structure, grain trade fi nance, lower Yangzi region, market proliferation, 
market integration
I. Introduction
During the period 1870-1936, many parts of China experienced rapid changes due to 
the opening to foreign trade and the introduction of new technologies in production, 
transportation, and communications.1 Meanwhile, the country in the nineteenth century 
査読論文
＊ Correspondence to：Kai Yiu Chan
 Associate Professor, Department of History, National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan
 No.1, University Road, Tainan City, Taiwan 701
 E-mail : kaiychan@mail.ncku.edu.tw
2 『社会システム研究』（第 25 号）
experienced what Yen-p’ing Hao describes as a ‘commercial revolution’, with new forms of 
money, credit, and banking being introduced or grown in their relative importance.2 These 
developments in industry and commerce were extended well into the early twentieth 
century until the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.3 In the midst of these 
market developments and institutional changes, how did the participants in the market 
solve their fi nancial problem? What kind of change, if any, took place in the fi nancial 
structure of the market participants? Did the fi nancial sector in China play an active role 
in the development of the market?
These questions are important not only because of the long-established discussion 
among European and American scholars on the role of bank-industry relations, which is 
still inconclusive,4 but also because of their relevance to the recent scholarly interest in 
China’s fi nancial and banking history. Scholars such as Yeh-chien Wang and Li Yixiang 
have extended the macro-economic discussion of bank-industry relations to the case of 
China; the former suggests the limited role played by banks to China’s early-twentieth-
century industrialization, while the latter suggests otherwise, especially the banks’ role in 
providing circulating capital.5 However, these scholars admitted that this debate cannot be 
thoroughly carried on without discussions from the micro-economic perspective. In this 
respect, other scholars such as Tomoko Shiroyama, Elisabeth Köll, and Kai Yiu Chan have 
been studying the financial devices and strategies adopted by republican Chinese 
businessmen to tap fi nancial resources and tackle their fi nancial problems. Beyond the 
notion of entrepreneurial devices, these studies also point out the importance of 
institutional arrangements to the actions of both bankers and businessmen during the 
early republican period.6
To answer the questions related to the dynamic inter-relationship between market, 
business, and fi nance, this paper adopts the case study approach by studying the grain 
trade in the lower Yangzi region from 1870 to 1936 in order to make a modest contribution 
to our understanding of the issue of business fi nance and market development. ‘Grain’ 
here refers to especially the two staple food grains of rice-paddy and fl our-wheat. Their 
importance in the Chinese diet has attracted considerable scholarly attention.7 Many of 
these previous studies have focused on the pre-nineteenth-century grain trade, market, 
and prices, with rice as the prime case of investigation. By comparing the fi nancial change 
in the trade of rice with that of fl our in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
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this paper hopes to bring the discussion on the interaction between market development, 
business, and fi nancial structures to a broader perspective. As the lower Yangzi region, an 
area here mainly refers to the Yangzi Delta, covering much of the waterways and fl atland 
of the Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Anhui provinces, being an important grain market 
and a centre for grain-processing, the interaction of its fi nancial sector with the market 
should be of illuminating implication to other parts of China.
II. Trade Increase and Network Extension
To examine the problem of business fi nance of the grain trade in the lower Yangzi 
region, it is necessary to outline the scale and scope of the trade itself. In fact, before 1870, 
although trade of the two grains (or related crops, i.e., paddy and wheat) in the region did 
exist during the two centuries before, and local markets fl ourished to the extent that 
offi cials could produce regular price reports to the emperor, only rice and paddy could 
afford to be carried for long-distance.8 Unlike rice (and paddy), wheat remained locally 
processed for fl our, by animal or human power, and traded within the networks of local 
towns and markets.9 Such an image persisted in the 1860s, when foreign writers reported 
the importance of the importation of rice but said ‘the trade in wheat, maize, and millet 
has hitherto been so trifl ing as to attract no attention.’10
In contrast, in the period under review, the trade of both grains fl ourished. For 
instance, the aggregate trade volume of rice and paddy in 1872, domestic and foreign, 
passing through the Imperial Maritime Customs in the lower Yangzi region amounted to 
more than 4.5 million piculs, with roughly 100,000 piculs of wheat and about 13,000 piculs 
of fl our being reported.11 Four decades later, in 1912, the trade volume of rice-paddy, 
wheat, and fl our in the region increased to roughly 8 million piculs, 580,000 piculs, and 1.8 
million piculs respectively.12
In subsequent years of the pre-war republic, the trade volume of these crops in the 
region continued to grow, with both flour and wheat experiencing increase to 
unprecedented levels. The aggregate transaction volume of rice and paddy trade in the 
lower Yangzi region rose from more than 20 million piculs in the period 1912-1916 to more 
than 36 million piculs in 1927-1931. Meanwhile, the aggregate transaction volume of fl our 
jumped from more than 12 million piculs in 1912-1916 to more than 38 million piculs in 
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1927-1931. Even in the depression years of 1932-1934, both grains still maintained an 
aggregate transaction volume of more than 24 million piculs in rice and 35 million piculs 
in fl our.13
Trade networks of these grains were also extended. In the pre-war republican years, 
foreign rice and paddy from Southeast Asia went into the region through Hong Kong. 
Meanwhile, the region itself hosted a considerable amount of domestic trade in rice and 
paddy, supplemented by those from others ports in Guangdong (such as Kowloon), and 
Hubei (such as Yichang). On the other hand, the region exported rice to both north and 
south, from Weihaiwei, Longkou, Andong, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Niuzhuang, Jiaochou, 
and Yantai in the north, and Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and Shantou in the south.14 In 
some major ports such as Shanghai, a considerable portion of that trade remained to be re-
exports to other domestic ports.15
In wheat and fl our trade, tremendous changes took place as it extended its networks’ 
coverage over the country. Wheat was basically imported within the region, supplemented 
by foreign sources and those from the middle Yangzi region. Most of the grains were 
transported to the milling centres, particularly Shanghai and Wuxi. After being processed, 
fl our from the lower Yangzi region was exported to the rest of the country, reaching an 
area covering not only within the region but also from North China’s Weihaiwei, Longkou, 
Andong, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Niuzhuang, Jiaochou, and Yantai, to South China’s 
Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, Guangzhou, and Wuzhou, Beihai, Qiongzhou, and Mengzi in 
Southwest China, and to Yichang in the middle Yangzi River. Within the three decades 
before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the lower Yangzi region became 
considerably export-oriented in terms of fl our.16 Re-exports of wheat and fl our that went 
through the ports of the region were also decreased, especially after the early 1920s.17
III. Financing Market Proliferation: the Rice Trade
Although both rice and fl our trade in the region increased, the trade of rice continued 
to rely upon the circulation of the food grain, while that of fl our focused on its processing. 
Such a difference caused a divergence in the two commodities’ marketing structure, and 
thence their pattern of business fi nance.
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In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the flow of the crop was 
facilitated by a chain of market participants. According to some Japanese surveys in the 
1900s, different groups of market participants who helped to bring the two produces to the 
markets in the lower Yangzi region included: 1) grain dealers in the source markets, who 
represented sellers there, 2) junk owners, who either acted as sellers’ representatives or on 
their own account, and 3) independent grain merchants. These market participants 
approached another group of market intermediaries in the product markets, such as 
Shanghai, which included rice and grain dealers for wholesaling, ‘rice shops’ for retailing, 
and ‘re-exporting dealers’ for re-exporting.18 The fl ow of rice in the Shanghai market is 
simplifi ed as in Diagram 1.
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Within this chain of market participants, rice wholesale dealers (mihao 米號 or 
mihang米行 ) in the product markets played the key function of facilitating the business 
transaction. These dealers were recognized by the state as brokers in the local markets, 
the ‘licensed brokers’ (yahang牙行 ). Although being liable for tax imposed by the local 
government, these ‘licensed brokers’ were the only legal middlemen in market 
transactions, bringing together outport sellers and local or other outport buyers, or agents 
of both parties.19 Even rice mills also accepted business entrusted by these wholesale 
dealers instead of obtaining materials by themselves.20 Under the Qing practice, these 
wholesale dealers acted as guarantors of market transactions.21 It implies that these 
brokers’ fi nancial responsibility would be considerable in case of default by any party 
concerned.
What is intriguing is the role of fi nance in the facilitation of trade of both grains. 
Although available records do not allow any detailed study on the business fi nance of grain 
trade during the late nineteenth century, scattered descriptions do suggest a possible 
scenario: the growth of grain trade (rice, wheat, and beans) in Shanghai and its vicinity 
nourished the earliest generation of native banks (qianzhuang錢莊 ) in the area well 
before 1870.22 Possibly, both grain merchants and native junk owners were the fore-fathers 
of the native banks.23 Even the origin of the local currency standard, the ‘Shanghai Tael’, 
could also be traced back to the grain trade via Shanghai.24 Obviously, in some cases, grain 
merchants were also native bankers.
Although we have no further knowledge about their fi nancial operations in detail, 
these native bankers who doubled as grain merchants might used their banks to settle 
accounts with those who traded with them. In particular, native bankers in the lower 
Yangzi region, especially those in Shanghai and Ningbo, developed the ‘transfer-tael 
system’, which allowed merchants to transfer funds between established native banks 
which were also guild members of the cities involved in the trade.25 Grain merchants, 
therefore, could settle their accounts by cross-balancing their books with native bankers 
and their trade partners, instead of transferring silver or copper cash in kind.
Besides the fi nancial guarantee provided by the brokers and the cross-balancing of 
accounts among grain merchants, grain trade in the lower Yangzi region during the 1900s 
also enjoyed the provision of credit through other fi nancial instruments of the late Qing. 
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According to the above-mentioned Japanese researches of the 1900s, at the level of the 
wholesale dealers in Shanghai, although the unit of payment was based on silver or copper 
coins, transaction was more often undertaken with other forms of payments, such as 
cheques, native bank orders (zhuangpiao莊票 ), and modern banknotes (yinhang zhibi銀
行 紙 幣 ), or cash notes (qianpiao 錢 票 ), which were widely acceptable in Shanghai. 
Payments were mostly made at the time of transaction, though an allowance of delay for 
fi ve to ten days was usually given.26
Indeed, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as these credit 
instruments and paper currencies were in fact based upon the hope of redemption at the 
end of the day for hard currency, Chinese merchants would therefore be seriously affected 
in times of monetary crises, as silver circulation and supply often fl uctuated.27 Yet without 
these credit instruments and paper currencies, Chinese merchants with limited capital 
might even fail to meet the demand from the market at the start. Their acceptance of the 
credit instruments signifi es their efforts to expand the size of the market.
Grain merchants or dealers from the source markets or the buyers in the product 
market in Shanghai could also make use of another instrument for credit, the certifi cate 
issued by warehouses (zhandan棧單 ) owned by the wholesale dealers in Shanghai. Grain 
merchants who sought for potential buyers in the product market could send their crops 
into this kind of warehouse which issued the certificate on the storage. The grain 
merchants could then bring the certifi cate to local bankers for discounting. Same system 
applied to the buyers in the product market who needed funds for the transaction.28 In this 
sense, although the warehouse did not provide credit to the merchants, while the banks 
did not take care of storage affairs, both parties helped the grain merchant’s fi nance. In 
some other markets in the lower Yangzi region, such as Wuxi, some warehouses even 
provided loans to grain merchants who stored the crops in the lender warehouse. However, 
it is not clear when this practice began.29
In the next twenty years or so, although the rice market continued to grow, there was 
no step taken by market participants for integration. (See Diagram 2) According to the 
reports of the early 1930s, the wholesale dealers in such large markets as Shanghai 
continued to play a crucial role in the rice trade.30 The only major change happened to this 
group of market participants was business concentration, as the number of wholesale 
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dealers decreased from 298 fi rms in the 1900s to only 117 in the early 1930s.31 On the other 
hand, new market agents appeared to serve the needs in the market, particularly in the 
area of fi nancing. In the three decades after the 1900s, a new group of market agents grew 
in its importance in the market by providing fi nancial services to others. They were called 
the ‘jingxiaoshang’ 經銷商 or ‘jingshou’ 經售 (‘distributors’) who originated in the late 
nineteenth century but fl ourished in the 1910s.32 Besides their various services for other 
market participants, the distributors also advanced needed funds to both buyers and 
sellers for 10 to 20 days.
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The provision of loans or credits by the ‘distributors’ in the Shanghai rice market 
means that the original market structure in the 1900s probably did not possess the 
fi nancial capacity for an increasing volume of business transaction. The demand for more 
funds probably came from the ever-growing prices of the crop. Chart 1 is a case in point, 
which demonstrates the rising imported rice prices in China during the period 1882-1931. 
It shows that price of imported rice rose from around 1 Haikwan Tael per picul in the early 
1880s to more than 3 Haikwan Taels per picul in the late 1900s and early 1910s, more 
than doubled in two decades. The price of imported rice continued to move upward to more 
than 5 Haikwan Taels per picul in the early 1930s, nearly doubled again over the late 
1900s fi gures. Domestic prices also show a similar picture. Chart 2 demonstrates the 
rising domestic rice prices in Shanghai during the pre-war republican years. It shows that 
price of the crop rose from around 8 yuan per unit in 1912 to around 16 yuan in 1931, 
doubled in two decades. Although the subsequent years witnessed a drop in rice prices, 
most of the price quotations ranged above 10 yuan per unit. Provided that the volume of 
transaction in rice in these years was ever-increasing, the total capital involved in 
transaction would be enormous. 
Chart 1. Prices of Imported Rice in China, 1882-1931
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T. R. Banister, ‘A Short History of the External Trade of China, 1834-81’, and ‘Synopsis of the 
External Trade of China, 1882-1931’, in Inspectorate-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, 
Decennial Reports on the Trade, Industries, etc., of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce, and 
on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 1922-31 (Shanghai: Oﬃ  ce of 
the Inspectorate General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, 1933), p. 179.
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Chart 2. Prices of Rice in Shanghai, 1912-1936
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paper presented at the 2002 Annual Conference of the Association of Business Historians, hosted by 
Centre for International Business History, the University of Reading, UK, 28-29 June 2002. 
 
In addition to the emergence of the ‘distributors’ in Shanghai, existing institutions of 
the pre-war republican period continued to provide fi nancial resources to facilitate trade. 
For example, rice shops, which were responsible for the retailing of rice, usually provided 
credits to customers by settling accounts on monthly basis.33 Meanwhile, some rice mills 
also provided advanced funds to rice merchants who would in turn entrust the mill to 
process the crop for a fee.34 The fi nancial sector also enlarged its involvement in the fi nance 
of rice trade by providing more varieties of credits to the market than in the 1900s. These 
new credit services included mortgage loans based on the property of the rice mill or the 
crops of the grain merchants, overdrafts based on individual merchant’s or dealer’s 
credibility, or ‘advances against documentary draft’ (yahui押匯 ) based on the documents 
for the crops in the source markets, domestic or foreign. Yet these fi nancial services were 
either not welcomed by the grain merchants or being too short-term to attract customers.35
The huge demand for fi nancial resources in rice trade also applied to other source 
markets in the lower Yangzi region. However, the source of capital was more likely to be 
provided for by local market agents. Indeed, the early 1930s’ surveys of some major 
upstream rice markets, including Wuxi, Zhenjiang, and Wuhu, suggest that the pattern 
and practice of trade was more or less the same as in Shanghai. Transactions were done by 
negotiations of different market agents instead of an integrated body. Much of the fi nancial 
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risks laid upon the local wholesale dealers (mihang米行 ), who not only provided credits to 
the grain merchants from the product markets (such as Shanghai) but also paid the grain 
price to the farmers in cash or in advance. They might also possess their own milling 
machines and warehouses to serve different needs of their customers. They might borrow 
from local modern banks or native banks but should possess a considerable amount of 
capital for the purchasing of the crops at seasonal occasions.36 In a nutshell, these local 
wholesale dealers played the same role as the ‘distributors’ in the Shanghai market.
In a sense, in the process of market development in the lower Yangzi region, rice trade 
witnessed a proliferation of market agents which provided capital and credit to fi nance the 
circulation of the crop. The involvement of banking institutions also took place mainly in 
circulating capital, in the form of fi nancial instruments and credits, instead of fi xed capital 
for machinery and buildings. Such a development pattern was considerably different from 
that of the fl our trade, the subject of the next section.
IV. Financing Market Integration: the Flour Trade
In fact, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the market structure of 
the fl our-wheat trade in the lower Yangzi region was not very different from that of rice 
and paddy. In fact, some of the wholesale dealers of grains (zalianghang 雜糧行 or 
lianghang糧行 ) handled both rice and wheat trade. Similar to what they did with the rice 
trade, these grain dealers in such product markets as Shanghai received the sellers from 
the source markets or acting as representatives of the buyers in the product markets 
(including the fl our mills). In this commodity fl ow, the fl our mills in Shanghai could send 
off their own representatives to the source markets but they usually approached the grain 
dealers either in the product markets or in the outport source markets for supply to reduce 
risk in having poor quality crops.37 The fl ow of wheat for fl our in the Shanghai market is 
simplifi ed as in Diagram 3.
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To fi nance this commodity fl ow, if the mills sent their representatives to the source 
markets, they would need to prepare a large amount of cash in small denomination. In 
contrast, if the mills purchased through the grain dealers, they could either pay in cash or 
delay payment for one to two weeks. They could even issue promissory notes (qipiao期票 ) 
for trade credit. Therefore, the mills often approached the grain dealers for trade credit.38
However, in the next few decades until the outbreak of war in 1937, the fl our trade in 
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the lower Yangzi region underwent substantial structural transformation. Crucial to this 
transformation was the fl our mills in the lower Yangzi region which took initiatives to 
adopt institutional devices to obtain supply of raw materials. One of these devices was the 
establishment of the ‘Shoumai Gonghui’ ( 收麥公會 ), a trade organization on wheat 
purchasing. It was set up in 1908 by seven fl our mills in Shanghai and Wuxi to adopt 
concerted actions in negotiation with the grain dealers in Shanghai and outport source 
markets.39 In doing so, the mill owners hoped to reduce or stabilize wheat prices through 
enhanced bargaining power in collective negotiation. 
Although this institution might not be able to take full credits for the stability and 
slow growth of wheat prices in the 1910s and 1920s, it certainly had some effects on the 
statistics, as shown in Chart 3. This chart demonstrates that although prices of wheat in 
the post-1908 years fl uctuated, it moved mostly within the range of 4 to 5 yuan per picul, 
until prices went record high in 1927 and after. Reasons for the turbulence in wheat prices 
require further research. War, such as that after the 1911 Revolution and that causing the 
fall of Yuan Shikai, might, on the one hand, push up prices, and on the other hand, might 
cause delays in transportation and production, and thus lowering the demand. Some 
extraordinary shipments of wheat from Sichuan to Shanghai shortly after the 1911 
Revolution had even saved some lower Yangzi fl our mills from bankruptcy, as wheat could 
be purchased at bargain prices.40 However, given the relative stability of wheat prices, the 
increase in transaction volume of wheat would only proportionately raise the demand for 
circulating funds. Flour mill owners would not have to encounter the fi nancial problems 
created by both trade increase and rising trend of raw material prices as we have 
discussed in the rice and paddy trade.
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Chart 3. Prices of Wheat in Shanghai, 1899-1927
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Academy of Social Sciences, Shanghai).
 
In the 1910s and early 1920s, some fl our mill owners also built up the trade with 
other established or new market agents. These included foreign trading fi rms who helped 
the mills to sell the fl our abroad during the First World War and the purchasing of foreign 
wheat, especially in the 1920s, to supplement local dearth of raw materials. Some mill 
owners also made use of the commodity exchanges, which were set up widely in the late 
1910s and early 1920s, to obtain raw materials and to sell the futures of their products.41
The exchange might also have an impact on the fl our prices in Shanghai. It was ruled 
that only Chinese fl our mill owners could enlist their products in the fl our exchange, and 
therefore considerably control the supply of the products. Meanwhile, brokers, backed by 
their clients who were also fl our mill owners, tried to affect prices by buying, selling, and 
hoarding futures of the produce.42 To a considerable extent, this strategy seems to work in 
the 1920s. Flour prices rose up in the early 1920s from under 2.5 yuan per unit to nearly 3 
yuan a unit in the middle of the decade, and maintained at the level above 3 yuan per unit 
after 1926 until the depression set in in the 1930s. (See Chart 4)
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Chart 4. Flour Prices in Shanghai, 1912-1936
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Source: Kai Yiu Chan, ‘Rice, Flour and Urban Food Consumption in Pre-War China, 1912-1936’, 
paper presented at the 2002 Annual Conference of the Association of Business Historians, hosted by 
Centre for International Business History, the University of Reading, UK, 28-29 June 2002. 
Side-by-side with these market agents, more importantly, the mill owners approached 
the source and product markets by themselves through an internal-institutional device, 
‘offi ces’, under the command of the mill owners. In the late 1900s and early 1910s, some 
fl our mill owners in the lower Yangzi region, including the Rongs from Wuxi and the Suns 
from Anhui, set up their own offi ces in the source and product markets to collect raw 
materials (the ‘wheat-purchasing offi ces’ banmaizhuang辦麥莊 ) and to distribute fi nal 
products (the ‘wholesaling offi ces’ pifachu批發處 ).43 Despite the differences in organization 
between the collecting and marketing offices, these business units were effectively 
controlled by the headquarters in Shanghai, making these enterprises qualifi ed to be 
regarded as ‘vertically integrated enterprises’.44 By doing so, the mills could obtain a 
reliable source of supply and marketing outlet side-by-side with the existing market 
agents. (See Diagram 4)
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In this new structure of the fl our-wheat market, indeed, wholesale dealers still played 
an important role in fi nancing. The wholesale dealers continued to provide considerable 
credits by accepting the cheques or promissory notes issued by the mill owners. In 
Shanghai, these bills could be cashed in 10 days, while in the outport markets, 3 to 10 
days. Both would allow the mill owners to buy time to sell their products.45 It was said that 
some of the mills, such as those of the Rong brothers, could even manage to sell their fl our 
before these bills being due.46
However, on many occasions, flour mills still took up much of the financial 
responsibility. Reports of the mid-1930s pointed out the fact that local mills in Taixian, 
Wujin, Tongshan, Huaiyin, Jiangdu, Wuxi, and in the capital Nanjing, had to pay cash 
upon transaction, either through a local dealer or collect directly from the farmers.47 
Besides, the mills had to pay all the costs and wages for the personnel and agency at the 
outport offi ces, not to say the costs for machinery and building. Their fi nancial burden was 
considerable.
The fl our mills in Shanghai might also acted as the clearing house for settlement of 
accounts between outport wholesale dealers and the mills’ outport purchasing and 
marketing offi ces. In this respect, only two set of scattered materials can provide some 
hints to uncover this secretive and intricate arrangement. The fi rst set concerns an 
emergency situation in 1925 due to the war then affecting Wuxi. The head of the Mow Sing 
Flour Mills and Foh Sing Flour Mills, Rong Zongjing, himself a Wuxi man, announced that 
his mills’ head offi ce in Shanghai could handle the remittance of his Wuxi fellows.48 
Presumably, his head offi ce in Shanghai must have long been keeping the books and funds 
of his mills and outport offi ces for internal transfer through bookkeeping. The second set of 
documents concerns complaints from the bankers in January 1937. According to the 
bankers’ account, the Foh Sing Flour Mills and their outport customers settled their 
accounts in Shanghai, although the commodities had already been processed for ‘advances 
against documentary draft’ with the bank.49 Obviously, the mills continued the practice of 
internal transfer of funds through the Shanghai head offi ce until the eve of the outbreak of 
the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Meanwhile, the fl our mills made use of the fi nancial institutions, native or modern, to 
obtain loans and credits for trade. For instance, fl our mills could use the warehouse 
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certificates to ask for banks at the source markets to lend by ‘advances against 
documentary draft’.50 In doing so, the mills’ scale of production should be large enough both 
to absorb raw materials and to process the fl our in large quantities.51 Flour mills also 
borrowed from modern and native banks by mortgaging their buildings and machinery, or 
by overdrafts based on personal or institutional credibility.52
To supplement loans from bankers, some fl our mills also adopted certain fi nancial 
devices and strategies. For instance, the various flour mills of the Rong brothers 
established a system of fi nancial operation to borrow and lend capital among themselves, 
namely the ‘current account with other factories’ (gechang wanglai各廠往來 ), in the 
1910s, and through the co-ordination of the ‘headquarters company’ (zong gongsi總公司 ) 
under Rong Zongjing’s command in the late 1920s and early 1930s. This ‘headquarters 
company’ even possessed a ‘Staff ’s Saving Department’ to receive deposits from its staff. 
The Rong brothers also made use of the funds of their own native banks, or invested in 
some native and modern Chinese banks to affect these banks’ lending policy.53 Another 
example was the owners of the Fu Feng Flour Mills, the Sun family of Anhui, who were 
also owners of the Chung Foo Union Bank (Zhongfu Yinhang中孚銀行 ), though it is not 
sure whether the bank or the mill provided the surplus fund for fi nancing.54
In short, as the fl our mills in the lower Yangzi region played an active role in re-
structuring the wheat and fl our market, their fi nancial involvement and responsibility in 
trade fi nance was enhanced to ensure the smooth fl ow of the commodity from the source 
markets to the factories. They approached banks and adopted new fi nancial devices for 
capital, and in turn, transferred these funds for both commodity circulation and 
production. Such characteristic contrasts sharply with what one can observe in the trade 
of rice.
V. Conclusion
What are the implications of our observations on the grain trade in the lower Yangzi 
region to our understanding of the role of fi nance in the market development of China 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? The above discussions clearly 
fi gure out two important actors in the fi nance of the grain trade: the wholesale dealers in 
rice trade, and the fl our mills in fl our trade. They were important because of their 
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respective fi nancial role in facilitating trade and processing, and their credibility to attract 
capital borrowed from bankers, either in the form of mortgage, overdrafts, or in ‘advances 
against documentary draft’. They were also very sensitive in making use of all the 
fi nancial instruments and institutions available in order to facilitate business fi nancing.
Such an argument certainly brings our discussion back to the question whether the 
fi nancial sector in China played an active role in the development of the market. At this 
preliminary stage of my research, I am reluctant to produce a quick answer without 
further reconsiderations but the above discussions and observations seem to suggest that 
the fi nancial sector in China then was only passively providing services for merchants and 
manufacturers to consider. To fi nance the grain trade in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, it was obviously the merchants and manufacturers who were creative 
and viable in search for substantial means.
I do not intend to downplay the work of the bankers, native or modern, to the fi nancial 
history of Chinese business. The bankers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries should have their own calculation of risks and returns, resulting in their passive 
role in providing funds for business fi nance. Some individual bankers might also have 
their own projects for some particular fi rms, for personal reasons perhaps. However, as the 
transaction and circulation of the crops often needed credits and funds in the fi rst place 
from the market participants themselves, it would be hard to imagine that the bankers of 
this period had done what might be thought as enough in facilitating trade fi nance.
On the other hand, the market participants of the grain trade in the lower Yangzi 
region managed to provide the needed fi nancial resources in the fi rst place and ultimately 
succeeded in attracting credits and loans from the bankers. Obviously, the institutional 
arrangements behind the scene must be complex and should not be under-estimated for 
their viability. In particular, the transfer of funds among mills and outport offi ces under 
the ownership of the same group of businessmen (e.g. the Rong brothers) certainly 
provided considerable fi nancial resources to meet outside demand.55 Other than this, was 
there other institutional arrangements working for the same cause? At this stage, it is 
hard to tell but this question will certainly be an important focus for further research.
To conclude, the study of business fi nance of grain trade in the lower Yangzi region 
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suggests that some market participants played a crucial role not only in the process of 
market development but also in the provisioning of fi nancial resources to facilitate trade. 
Such a role reveals the vitality of the institutional arrangements of the market 
participants to absorb risk and manage fi nance. Without these institutional arrangements, 
the market probably would have to fall back on the rather passive and conservative 
fi nancial sector for resources and credit. A slower pace of growth and smaller scale of 
business, therefore, might have come forth.
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